I am a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Economics at the University of Texas at Austin.
I am on the 2026-2027 job market.
My research interests lie in information economics, game theory, mechanism design, and contract theory. Broadly, I study how information shapes incentives, strategic interactions, and market outcomes. My current research focuses on the design of information and institutions under asymmetric information, with applications to contracts, organizations, and digital markets.
Job Market Paper
Studies optimal monitoring when adverse selection and moral hazard coexist. The principal allocates monitoring resources between learning the agent's private type and observing the agent's hidden action, with implications for the design and value of information.
Work in Progress
Studies contract design in risky work when workers privately know their ability, can hide failures, and face limited liability. Behavioral data can make otherwise infeasible markets possible, while using exposure to risk as a screening device can lead platforms to choose inefficiently high intensity.
Work in Progress
Studies dynamic privacy choices when incumbent platforms compete for users whose data persist over time. Privacy protection is non-monotone in switching costs: strong competition can discipline data collection, while a weak outside option can induce greater disclosure than monopoly, with implications for data portability and erasure policies.
Teaching assistant and/or grader for:
